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China's modernization is already rapidly improving the welfare of one 
quarter of mankind and changing communist ideology. But China is not only 
growing more stable and prosperous, it is also growing stronger. China's 
fourth modernization, national defence, is rarely treated in great detail, but it 
is increasingly clear that the reform of the defence sector is also having an 
important impact on both domestic and foreign policy. The process began in 
earnest in 1978 and by 1987 had completed its first stage of reorganization. 
At a major meeting of military and civilian officials in December 1986, the 
strategy for the next phase of military modernization was discussed.l At the 
dawn of the new age of Chinese military power, it is essential to assess the 
implications of a stronger China for China itself, its neighbors, and the great 
power balance. 
Defence Modernization 
The modernization of China's national defence over the past eight years has 
been the most rapid and sustained since the founding of the People's 
Republic in 1949.2 Although it is still in its initial stages, defence 
modernization has clearly moved from the realm of merely innovative talk to 
implementation. To be sure, the process will be protracted, but it is clear that 
the commitment to real reform is genuine. What is more, this modernization 
has been achieved without an increase in the share of the budget spent on 
defence or wholesale re-equipment. Unlike during previous modernization 
as in the 1950s, the current improvements have been achieved without 
significant foreign assistance. 
Military modernization has been primarily evident in four spheres. First, 
any real reform requires a modernized military doctrine before modem 
equipment is introduced. The new doctrine of "people's war under modem 
condition" is not a complete break with the past. But it has discarded obsolete 
principles that prevent China from making the best of its meagre resources in 
meeting the threat from a modern, mobile enemy. Among the major reforms 
is the notion that strategy and tactics are now formulated by military 
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profesionals rather than Party bureaucrats. Second, except in the most 
unlikely case of total invasion, China has formally abandoned the notion of 
letting invaders strike deep into China so as to "swallow them up in a sea of 
people's war". The new theories of "active defence" and "positive defence" 
suggest that China may retreat in some circumstances, but will also stand and 
fight a conventional war to save high value targets such as cities and major 
industries. Combat is likely to be more destructive and "three dimensional", 
so China will rely more directly on its reorganized forces and less on the 
relatively untrained militia. 
Thus the PLA has abandoned its primary reliance on ground forces and 
simple tactics in favor of more regularized combined arms operations. The 
result is a more mobile, fluid strategy that puts greater stress on complex, 
professional methods of command and control. Any attacker contemplating 
taking on the PLA will already have to count on paying a much higher 
cost. 
The second sphere of modernizatioh is in weapons and equipment. It is 
true that the defence budget has fallen as a proportion of the overall budget 
and has only begun to rise in real terms since 1985. But in recent years 
important savings have been made by reducing the size of the PLA by one 
quarter, a process due to be completed during 1987 when one million men 
will have been demobilized. Military planning has also been reorganised and 
professional control of decision-making has been strengthened. The military 
industries have been shaken up, reducing overlap and inefficiency. Large 
sections of military industry that previously produced civilian goods have 
been transferred to the civilian sector, thereby freeing parts of the defence 
budget for true military expenditure. China has also been earning billions of 
dollars during the past five yeats in arms sales abroad. More prosaic saving 
has been made by reducing waste, inefficiency and corruption, and by 
reshaping the bloated administration of the defence sector. 
All these reforms have freed more money for new equipment. Little of 
substance has been purchased from abroad and China has opted for 
relatively inexpensive, defensive modern technology& The infantry has been 
given greater mobility by upgrading transport and modernizing its logistic 
"tail". The services have acquired a whole range of new weapons, including 
anti-tank, anti-aircraft and anti-ship missiles. Follow-on models of tanks, 
aircraft and ships have been deployed or tested in recent years, all making 
use of modern technologies such as lasers and computers. Chinese troops, 
and especially the airforce and navy, have been acquiring equipment to 
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increase their power projection. Long-range bombers, in-flight refuelling, 
long-distance naval replenishment and amphibious tanks and armoured 
vehicles have all been developed in recent years and suggest that Beijing is 
not merely interested in defending Chit~a.~ Nuclear weapons have also been 
modernized, with new ICBMs, SLBMs and MIRV technology all coming into 
production. In January 1987 China's new nuclear submarine passed its sea 
trials and began regular service. In sum, the PLA's equipment may not be first 
rate, but neither is ii to be dismissed as third rate. 
Third, the PLA has undertaken a wide range of internal reforms. The 
quality of leadership has been raised by bringing in younger, better trained 
professionals. With new systems of selection and promotion, the role of 
military academies has become central. Formal education has become an 
essential requirement of modem PLA officers and promotion depends on 
results. 
Not surprisingly, in such an environment military training takes on added 
importance. Large scale manoeuvres to hone professionals skills have taken 
place in recent years. The more rigorous standards of modem war require 
more intelligent professionals, able to control combined arms operations and 
modern equipment. 
Fourth, civil-military relations have been put on a more sensible footing. 
After the disaster of the Cultural Revolution when the PLA entered politics 
and politics entered the PLA, the combat strength of the armed forces was 
badly damaged. In recent years the PLA has willingly given up its powerful 
influence in civilian politics in the regions and in Beijing. Deng Xiaoping has 
shuffled regional military commanders to break up their fiefs. He has re- 
organised the military regions themselves, in June 1985, reducing to 7 the old 
system of 11 regions. 
This return to the barracks has freed officers from the troublesome press- 
ures of government and allowed them to concentrate on professional 
pursuits. This has only been possible because of the moderation and stability 
in civilian politics and the satisfaction Deng has given to professionals 
concerned about improving military standards. The once powerful political 
commissars have obviously been relegated to the peripheral role. Some 
older, more politically oriented officers have been opposed to relinquishing 
their power, but they are literally a dying problem. 
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PLA Strength and Domestic Politics 
These reforms in the PLA are in themselves far-reaching, but their 
significance goes beyond the armed forces. The impact has been first felt in 
China's general domestic politics. Chinese politics had been transformed in 
the 1960s when the armed forces were drawn into the civil fray of the 
Cultural Revolution. The PLA under its people's war strategy was also 
heavily involved in relief efforts, support for the Chinese economy and 
served as a revolutionary model. When the authority of the Party was 
smashed by Mao Zedong, the PLA restored order throughout China and 
found itself entrenched in regional and national politics. 
The PLA had become the most interventionist of all armed forces in the 
Communist world, at least until the Polish crisis of the early 1980s. But in 
recent years the modernization of the armed forces has once again trans- 
formed the face of Chinese politics and brought the PLA much closer to the 
norm for an armed force in a Communist state. Today's PLA is less of a power 
broker and more of a normal participant in Chinese politics. 
The PLA was only willing to surrender its leading role in Chinese politics 
because a number of elements was present. First, it was clear that the overall 
Chinese reforms were bringing stability. The PLA had entered politics 
because of instability and there was now no longer a need for it to restore or 
maintain order. 
Second, the PLA was allowed to pursue its professional interests by a 
civilian regime that supported the notion of professionalism throughout 
society. The PLA was not going to be happy to be removed from power if it 
merely went back to empty barracks with little to do to engender pride. 
Third, the PLA was promised further resources to pursue its professionalism, 
although most of these were made available by cutting from other sectors of 
the non-professional PLA budget. In 1986 it appeared that the slimmed 
down, more professional armed forces were even getting more money in 
absolute terms. 
This image of a modernized PLA, happy to return to the barracks and no 
longer a power broker in Beijing is a major change. The PLA has become a 
mirror of the society at large, pursuing modernization, minimizing politics, 
and getting on with b~siness.~ To be sure, there remains some politics and 
factionalism within the PLA, as there is in other sectors of modem China. But 
it is not the politics of an armed forces pitted against civil authority. Rather 
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there are debates between fast and slow modernizers, or pragmatists and 
ideologists within the PLA, just as these debates take place in other sectors of 
civilian life such as in education. These differences reach up to the Party in 
the region and the Politburo in Beijing. 
The implications of these reforms in the PLA are sweeping. Above all, they 
help ensure that the political system remains stable, and with basic stability 
the armed forces can undertake the long term task of further modernization. 
In this sense, the success of China's entire modernization process is 
enhanced by the succes of the fourth, military, modernization. The stability of 
the political system is evident in changes in three main sectors. First, the drain 
on the exchequer of a bloated defence sector is reduced. The inefficiency of 
the defence industries is reduced by transferring them to streamlined civilian 
control under modem methods of management and with the bracing con- 
straints of the market place. Defence spending itself has been reduced as a 
percentage of total government spending, thus freeing further funds for 
more profitable investment. Once again, the PLA contributes directly to the 
stability of China by enhancing modernization. 
Second, by withdrawing the PLA from civilian politics, the dangers of 
regionalism are reduced. The independent kingdoms of the old military 
commanders are no longer a threat to the central government's ability to 
implement as well as formulate policy. However, in a country as large as 
China, regionalism will, of course, always remain a threat to a central 
government that wishes to harness the full, coordinated capability of all 
China. 
Third, the withdrawal of the PLA from the rural economy helps reduce the 
distortion that its presence caused in recent years. Bereft of PLA support, 
failing and bankrupt ventures in the countryside can now be closed or 
reformed. Local peasants can develop their own transport and labour prac- 
tices, free from the wider interests of a military forced to become involved in 
civilian politics. 
There remains, of course, serious uncertainties about just how this process 
will affect modernization in the future. The extent to which the armed forces 
remain in control of certain industries has bedevilled Soviet planners looking 
for the best path to reform of a centrally planned economy. If the Soviet 
model is anything to go by, at least in the heavy industrial and electronic 
sectors, the PLA will continue to demand a major voice so as to ensure that its 
weapons can be produced when needed. The resulting distortion of a strong 
military voice in a command economy will then continue to hinder economic 
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growth. 
Furthermore, it is likely that the PLA will continue to be a conservative 
voice in civilian politics even if it does have its own internal divisions. If its 
primary concern remains stability in the inevitable roller-coasterlike reform 
process, it is understandable that the PLA will argue for caution. But 
conservative reformers in the PLA can still be reformers. 
On balance, these trends suggest that the PLA will become a more normal, 
and therefore less important actor in Chinese domestic politics. While this 
may make Chinese politics less interesting to the outside observer, it is a 
positive trend for the PLA and for China. Thus one of the most successfull 
fruits of PTA modernization is greater stability in the political system and 
greater chance of success in the process of modernization. Especially in 
comparison to the instability and failure of past Chinese policies this new 
trend, and the PLA role within it, is of great consequence. 
The Strategy of Strength 
As China and its armed forces grow strong, the country also grows more 
important in international relations. Most analysis of this trend into the 21st 
century has focused on China as an international trade partner. However, a 
stronger China also affects the international balance of military power. 
In Chinese defence culture, and indeed in terms of Communist ideology, 
the global balance of power is understood as the "correlation of forces". A 
stronger China has already begun to recognize the altered balance of power 
in a number of ways. First, China feels that its own strength is increasing in 
absolute terms by virtue of its more modem armed forces. Thus it is less 
likely that war can be imposed on China by an aggresive enemy and Beijing 
can look forward to a longer period of peace. Second, China's power has 
increased relative to others because its main rivals, the superpowers, have 
seen their power decline in important ways. For example, economic and 
social problems in Soviet Union have sapped Moscow's ability to continue its 
military buildup. The growth in American military power has also given the 
Soviet Union more to worry about.6 
Third, China has also perceived that the world is a more complex and 
interdependent place than it first thought. Thus military power is less 
immediately useful as an instrument of foreign policy, especially for the 
superpowers, In East Asia, the growth of the Newly Industrializing Countries 
has demonstrated that the international economy is more interdependent, 
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and less likely to see the use of military force.6 
The implications of this changing correlation of forces have already begun 
to emerge. Most notably, China has declared since 1980 that world war is no 
longer inevitable. In the past, Beijing believed that the "forces for peace" were 
not necessarily sufficiently strong to withstand the "forces for war", especially 
the domineering superpowers. In the short term, the ability to delay or 
prevent war means that China has a breathing space to pursue its 
modernization in peace. Depending on how long this breathing space lasts, it 
is therefore unlikely that in the short term China would like to make use of 
what it sees as the more favorable balance of power to steal a march on its 
enemies. 
In the medium or longer term, the absence of a world war will serve the 
interests of once-weaker states like China. While China probably does not 
expect to catch up in economic terms to the superpowers' level, it does have 
the example of a war-ravaged Japan that in 40 years of sustained growth now 
looks set to overtake the Soviet Union as the world's second largest 
economy. Thus the first implication of China's new strength is a greater sense 
of confidence that comes from having the opportunity to pursue effective 
modernization in peace. 
Second, the changed correlation of forces also allows China to adopt a 
more flexible foreign policy. Its previous, failed strategy of the 'Three 
Worlds" did not take into account just how intricate and intertwined the 
balance of power really was. Thus China has now come to understand that 
Third World conflict is not easily subject to superpower manipulation and 
that the much sought-after unity of the third world is a  hime era.^ The most 
prosperous, and increasingly peaceful part of the developing world is in 
China's own backyard, East Asia. China could apply its new-found strengths 
in the balance of power nearer to home. 
Perhaps the most important impact of the new balance of power was on 
China's ability to adopt a more balanced position between the superpowers. 
In the 1970s, when it perceived an imminent and more direct Soviet threat, 
China leaned more sharply to the United States. The fact that it leaned so far 
as to be nearly horizontal, led eventually to the reassessment of Soviet power 
and the international strategic balance. It is clear that as China grows strong, it 
also grows more independent of both superpowers, assuming the pivotal 
position in the great power triangle. In terms of the balance of power, this is 
the most enviable place to be, with the ability to play off one potential partner 
against the other. 
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Standing Up to the Superpowers 
China's new-found sense of strength has already begun to affect the global 
balance of power, and especially the pattern of Sino-Soviet relations. As part 
of its new military doctrine, the PLA has pulled back its crack troops several 
hundred miles from the frontier with the Soviet Union. By 1987 it will have 
completed the reduction of the PLA by one quarter, slashing one million 
men from the rolls. These unilateral arms control measures have had a 
profound impact on the balance of power in Asia. 
China's arms control is undoubtely the single largest reduction in military 
power since Khmshchev trimmed one million men from the Soviet Army in 
the early 1960s. Since the majority of the Chinese troops is oriented towards 
meeting a perceived Soviet threat, it now appears that some 100.000-150.000 
Chinese troops have been removed from the order of battle facing the Soviet 
U n i ~ n . ~  It is one of the great paradoxes of China's new strength that it can 
lead to a reduction rather than an increase in the threat of war. The Soviet fear 
of Chinese hordes sweeping across the empty frontier has been reduced as 
China modernizes and trims the PLA. 
Of course, it was unlikely that China would pursue such unilateral arms 
control if it did not feel that its initial signs of detente were being reciprocated. 
The weave of recent Sino-Soviet detente is too complicated to be related 
here. But suffice it to say that the motives for and the process of Sino-Soviet 
detente have involved a range of ideological and economic, as well as 
military factors. In recent years the Soviet Union has been far-sighted enough 
to reciprocate the Chinese overtures with its own form of tacit arms 
control. 
Since 1984-85 the Soviet forces in East Asia have been thinned out. While 
the number of Soviet divisions remains relatively constant, the readiness of 
those forces has been reduced, amounting to a withdrawal of some 100.000 
troops. The Soviet Union has also seen that China's military reforms are 
producing a more professional armed forces, a trend likely to discourage the 
kind of adventurism and irrationality on the part of China that Moscow 
feared in the past. A more professional PLA makes for a more rational China 
in time of crisis. 
To be sure, the Soviet forces remain a formidable threat. Despite Mikhail 
Gorbachets July 1986 speech in Vladivostok: Moscow is unlikely to make 
more swingeing cuts in its armed forces without further encouragement 
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from Beijing. But it remains true that this sigruficant level of military detente 
has encouraged the broader process of Sino-Soviet detente. Gorbachev has 
thus been further nudged to explore the possibilities of the Soviet Union 
playing a more active part in the Pacific Century. In an atmosphere of cool 
superpower relations and warming Sino-Soviet relations, the role of recent 
changes in Chinese policy can be said to have a major impact on the strategic 
balance. 
If the original Sino-Soviet split is understood as the single greatest shift in 
the strategic balance since 1945, then the warming of Sino-Soviet relations is 
nearly of equal importance. Chinese forces are clearly not in the league of the 
superpowers, but when their place in the strategic balance is shifted, they still 
will have an appreciable impact on the global balance of power. 
Of course, China's military weight is felt primarily in its conventional 
forces. But changes in China's nuclear arsenal have also affected Soviet and 
superpower calculations. Since 1980, China has been reinforcing its nuclear 
arsenal in order to enhance its doctrine of minimum deterrence by denial 
with a wide range of nuclear forces. The enhancements have not left China 
with an appreciably larger arsenal, but it is more flexible and secure. Since 
China is the third largest nuclear weapons power, it is only natural that the 
superpowers would react to such developments. 
The Soviet Union has long demanded a "China quotient" in superpower 
arms control in order to deal with the perceived Chinese threat. Equally, if 
less discussed, the United States has retained Chinese targets on the SIOP. 
Thus changes in China's nuclear forces have complicated superpower arms 
control, especially on INF. As the discussions at Reykjavik summit in October 
1986 remind us, both superpowers are keen to retain sufficient nuclear 
weapons for use in the East Asia theatre. 
Equally, China has watched the process of superpower arms control for 
signs of a carve-up that would harm the interests of "third parties". Most 
notable in this category is the question of SDI. Should such a defensive 
system be deployed by either superpower, China, together with other 
medium powers with limited nuclear forces, will find it necessary to increase 
its forces in order to ensure a reliable deterrent.1° On the other hand, should 
such an SDI be deployed along with deep cuts in the strategic arsenals of 
both powers, then China's limited nuclear weapons would constitute a far 
greater proportion of world totals. 
Whatever the case, there are no signs that China foresees the need for 
vastly increased nuclear forces. From Beijing's perspective, growing military 
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power will not be in the nuclear field except to maintain a nuclear force that 
can carry out its minimum deterrent of a range of threats within a doctrine of 
deterrence by denial. 
It is notable that the longer range and greater flexibility of China's nuclear 
weapons enhances its ability to strike at either superpower. The United States 
has not commented openly on the implications of China's new capability, for 
when the overall total of nuclear weapons is considered, China remains a 
marginal actor. What has been of greater interest to the United States is the 
shift to greater independence in Chinese foreign policy that has been part of 
Beijing's increased sense of international confidence. 
In recent years this independence has been manifest in the more open 
Chinese attacks on United States policy in the third world and on North- 
South relations, China has also established closer relations with American 
enemies, including Cuba and Nicaragua. Some Americans have called this 
China's "two Americas" policy, reminding Beijing of its criticism of the 
United States for trying to maintain good relations with both Taiwan and 
China. China has also excelled in tweaking the American superpower's nose. 
When seeking to curry favor with South Pacific states, China withdrew an 
invitation to the United States navy to visit Chinese ports unless the ships 
concerned declared they were not carrying nuclear weapons,ll Although the 
trip eventually did take place in October 1986, China had demonstrated its 
willingness to take symbolic actions in support of its fine words of foreign 
policy independence, 
The Reagan administration has been more willing than most to put up 
with Chinese tactics because of changes in the United States' own priorities 
in East Asia. The shift to greater concern with offshore power in support of 
Japan, Taiwan and trade routes in general, has allowed the United States to 
be more relaxed in its reaction to China. In addition, the Reagan 
administration has offered stronger support to Taiwan by allowing "private" 
firms to sell arms while official government-to-government sales are cut 
back12 Chinese reaction has been quietly brushed aside as the PRC-US 
military contacts continue. 
While it is true that the impact of a stronger China has so far largely served 
United States interests - for example in helping contain the Soviet Union - the 
expected economic bonanza has failed to materialize. China has largely 
refused to buy American weapons on a large scale, although it has been 
looking longingly at catalogues on the shelf for years. In some cases China 
has even found it preferable to steal technology from the United States in 
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order to speed up military modernization at home. 
Into the medium and longer term there is even greater reason for 
American concern about the implication of a stronger China. A China less 
worried about a Soviet threat and increasingly concerned about a growing 
independence movement in Taiwan might well find itself in direct conflict 
with United States policy. In fact, it is in the regional sphere that the 
implications of China's new strength seem most destabilizing. 
Shifting Asian Balances of Power 
While China has usually been described as a great power, its most effective 
foreign policy reach barely extends to the outer fringes of Asia. Its great 
power status was largely based on others' perceptions of Chinese potential, 
and the fact that many of the international conflicts took place on China's 
doorstep. But even in the period when China was weak, it still managed to 
wage several wars in Asia. China has lost more men in combat than any other 
great power since 1945.13 As China grows strong and looms even larger over 
its Asian neighbours, the balance of power in Asia is bound to shift. 
China's new self-confidence is already evident in its approach to the still 
unresolved Korean conflict. In the days of greater insecurity, China vied with 
the Soviet Union for every inch of influence in North Korea. The more 
confident China has not been deeply upset by an increase of Soviet sway in 
Pyongyang because China itself is less fearful of Soviet intentions. What is 
more, China recognizes the Soviet stake in a stable Korea and their joint 
interest in making their mutual North Korean ally less burdensome or risky. 
China has even been so bold as to develop an annual trade with South Korea 
worth some $ lbn per year, far more than Sino-North Korean trade.14 A 
stronger, more secure China apparently has less stake in supporting the 
dangerous ambitions of its allies - a policy reminiscent of Soviet warnings to 
China in the 1950s about pursuing an aggresive policy towards the United 
States. 
However, a stronger China is not necessarily less adventurous if the stake 
is Chinese rather than allied interest. China has more unsettled territorial 
claims than any other major power, disputing borders with the Soviet Union 
in the north, Japan and Taiwan in the east, and Vietnam and India in the 
south. China's military instrument has usually been used only when it was 
strong enough to take what it claimed. When the will and the ability were 
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present, as in 1962 against India or 1974 in the Paracels, China moved swiftly. 
In 1979, the will was not backed by the ability to carry out an effective military 
operation and China failed to "teach Vietnam a lesson." 
Currently, China is restained from using force for a variety of reasons. In 
the Soviet case, China finds that detente is better route to meeting its claim; 
Gorbachev recognized the Chinese case on the river frontier in July 1986. 
Territorial claims against Japan are put on the back burner because Japan is 
far too important as a trading partner and crisis over disputed islands would 
undermine Chinese creditworthiness. China is deterred from forcing the 
pace in Taiwan because it hopes the island will go the route of Hong Kong, 
and fall into its lap under the banner of "one country, two systems". Yet Hu 
Yaobang has already made clear that China does not rule out the use of 
military force to regain Taiwan. He has even suggested that the passage of 
time is precisely what is needed to convince Taiwan that China is strong 
enough to get its way.16 China's growing naval strength and ability to deploy 
more force at longer ranges suggest that China has not ruled out military 
operation against Taiwan. 
The Taiwan problem remains perhaps the most serious threat to China's 
image as a peaceful participant in the Pacific century. With a continuing 
economic boom and the passage of time in Taiwan, reunification becomes 
less, rather than more likely. There is nothing inevitable about a single nation 
of all Chinese (note the 19 Arab states) and it would be foolish to expect 
China to sit idly by while Taiwan drifts further away. Only then will the 
challenge of China's growing strength force the United States to react 
decisively. 
But if the Americans will eventually have to face the implication of Chinese 
strength, so will the Soviet Union. China's attack on Vietnam and Soviet 
deterrence of wider Chinese actions in 1979 suggest just how involved 
Moscow may have to become. So far, Vietnam has been able to stand largely 
on its own against a relatively weak PLA. Should the Kampuchean question 
not be resolved before China's strength becomes convincing, then a "second 
lesson" cannot be ruled out. Vietnam, like Taiwan, has a great deal to fear 
from a more powerful China that has managed to sever the links between its 
smaller neighbors and their superpower patron. 
Further afield, it is China's growing naval strength and evolution of a "blue 
water" navy that poses the greatest risk of instability in Asia. As Chinese 
ships sail out to the South Pacific and the Indian Ocean, a number of 
Southeast and South Asian states have reason to be concerned. Indonesia 
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and India have long feared the role of a powerful China sailing into their 
troubled waters. Both see themselves as regional powers with positions 
vulnerable to Chinese expansion. The more China throws its weight around 
in Southeast Asia or against Taiwan, the more other ASEAN states will fear a 
stronger China. It is one thing to have a flawed Chma as a counterweight to 
superpower influence, but quite another when the superpowers are seeking 
Chinese favor and Beijing is more able and willing to intervene in the region. 
As China tests its nuclear missiles in the Pacific and sails its SSBNs into the 
Indian Ocean, it is not likely to project a truly peaceful image to those already 
worried for ethnic and geostrategic reasons about its growing strength. If 
China is not on its best behavior as it grows strong, it will also grow more 
threatening to its neighbors. That is the volatile stuff of arms races and 
crises. 
The Long Arm of China 
A key characteristic of a great power becoming a superpower is the lengtheri- 
ing reach of its foreign and security policy arm. China's foreign policy has 
long been interested in events in far-off Africa or the Middle East, but has 
been restricted by its inability to give large scale military aid to countries 
where opportunities for greater influence present themselves. Thus the 
outbreak of crisis in the developing world often left China frustrated, with 
fine words but little scope for action. However, as China grows stronger its 
reach is extending further into the distant developing world. 
By the late 1970s China's third world policy was in a state of confusion. Its 
revolutionary model had been abandoned, and replaced with a hodge- 
podge of polities, often placing China in alliance with reactionaries and allies 
of the United States or even South Africa. But with new pragmatism at home 
as a model, China took another look at the developing world. It saw great 
confusion in local politics, but the possibility of monetary reward. Thus a 
stronger China formulated a new strategy for the 1980s. 
Instead of offering only advice to states in conflict, it would also offer arms. 
But unlike most previous arms transfers, China was now prepared to sell 
rather than give the weapons away.lThinese policy required three things, 1) 
wars to exploit the need of combatants for the tools of the trade, 2) rich 
combatants or ones with rich friends who could afford to pay for the 
hardware, 3) combatants with requirements for inexpensive, but hardy 
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weaponry for the rough conditions of conflict in the developing world. China 
found such a mix in the Iran-Iraq war and began earning billions every year 
by selling arms to both sides of the battle lines. 
China's arms industry was reorganized and China began attending inter- 
national arms fairs. In November 1986 a huge arms fair was held in Beijing, 
mainly for the third world buyers. As part of this globalization of the Chinese 
arms industry, it has begun co-production deals with various third world 
states, including some in far-off Latin America. Unlike Britain and France, 
China does not seek to supply weapons with the same level of sophistication 
as the superpowers. But it has spotted a market niche in bargain basement 
weapons. With the rising cost of modem war, that market looks like growing, 
and reinforcing China's dubious honor of being the world's fourth largest 
arms exporter. 
Of course, China is unlikely to earn lasting influence from its arms sales. 
Like the superpowers, China knows that while the allegiance of developing 
states can be "rented", it can rarely be bought for long. Hence perhaps the 
shift to more cynical arms sales such as those to both sides of a conflict. If 
another Angola-type conflict were to arise and a combatant needed 
weapons, China could stay in the arms game, unlike in 1974 when it had to 
retreat in the face of the superior ability of the superpowers to deliver the 
arms that were needed. But unless the combatants could pay, it is unlikely 
that China would manipulate successfully its new potential for arms 
transfers. China's longer reach, if it remains primarily for profit rather than 
political gain, will be less threatening to the interests of others powers. 
What might be more challenging is the new Chinese model of military 
modernization for the developing world that seems to be emerging as China 
grows strong. The message is three fold. First, development is only possible if 
the armed forces are reduced. Second, the soldiers should concentrate only 
on soldiering and not intervene in politics. Third, developing states need a 
peaceful international environment with more open, outward oriented econ- 
omies. A less confrontational approach to the outside world is to be much 
preferred. 
Needless to say this is not a message that the military dictatorships in the 
developing world want to hear. It would frequently undermine the ruling 
elite and force developing states to focus on their own responsibilities rather 
than seeking the excuse of foreign wars or falling back on sterile attacks on 
the developed North. This Chinese message is more in keeping with the 
recent trend in East Asia where developing states have achieved remarkable 
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progress by avoiding war and concentrating on trade and economic 
growth. 
On balance, a stronger China is one with wider global commitments, but 
with less responsibilities and caution. It is a China more focussed on 
domestic stability and growth and the possibilty of improving its regional 
position in East Asia. In the short term, a stronger China is a more peaceful 
China. But in the longer term there is strong evidence that China will not sit 
idly by while the NICs and Japan keep moving the goal-posts of successful 
modernization. The temptation to imperialism that was so fatally attractive to 
Japan a century ago may yet beckon to Beijing. 
Gerald Segal is Lecturer in  Politics at the University of Bristol, England. 
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